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EXPERTS, STORIES, AND INFORMATION
Richard Lempert*
I.

EDUCATION AND DEFERENCE: AN UNHELPFUL DICHOTOMY

In the infancy of the jury trial, there were no witnesses. The jury
was self-informing. Members of the jury were drawn from the community. It was expected that they would know, either firsthand or on the
basis of what they had heard, the true facts of any disputed incident, and
they were gathered together to say what those facts were. Ronald Allen
and Joseph Miller, in their insightful paper, see the ideal of the self-informing jury as very much alive today.1 Allen and Miller tell us that
jurors ideally should experience firsthand the factual information needed
to arrive at rational verdicts. In their ideal world, jurors compelled to
rely on others' accounts would enter the heads of witnesses to distinguish
what was actually observed from what was added, lost, or distorted in
the recounting process. According to this model, witnesses should educate jurors on relevant facts within their knowledge, and jurors should
assimilate the facts presented by the various witnesses to determine both
what happened and the implications of those events given the applicable
law.
This model works tolerably well, according to Allen and Miller,
when ordinary people-that is, people like the jurors-are testifying to
facts that ordinary people can easily understand. But it potentially
breaks down when jurors lack the knowledge and experience that a witness has brought to his observations. In these circumstances, jurors often
will not know what to make of the witness's observations, creating a danger that the jury will simply defer to the witness and accept whatever
conclusion the witness has reached. This danger is exacerbated, the more
conclusory the witness's testimony, which is to say the less its factual and
theoretical underpinnings are revealed. "Danger" is a loaded word, but
it is appropriate here because the common law's norm, according to Allen and Miller, is that jurors should be educated by witnesses; they
should not defer to them. Education and deference, Allen and Miller tell
us, "are the choices that are available" to jurors presented with new
* Francis A. Allen Collegiate Professor of Law and Professor of Sociology, University of Michigan. A.B., Oberlin College, 1964; J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1968; Ph.D., University
of Michigan, 1972.
1 Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 1131 (1993).
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knowledge. 2 These choices constitute a dichotomy that is central to Allen and Miller's argument, a dichotomy they use creatively to illuminate
various academic debates concerning expert testimony.
My views are different. Treating education and deference as a dichotomy highlights the importance of attending to the implications of
different policies for informing juries, but it fails as an analytic paradigm.
The common law's ideal trial (accepting Allen and Miller's characterization) does not and cannot exist. Juries often defer to the opinions and
conclusions of witnesses, both expert and lay, even when witness testimony educates them in basic facts. Conversely, juries may learn little
about the factual underpinnings of witnesses' conclusions yet still not defer to them.
Consider a simple larceny trial. The state's first witness testifies that
she saw A, standing at a 7-11 check out counter, put his hat on just as the
clerk opened the cash drawer. Then she heard a loud crash, saw the
clerk leave her position to investigate, and saw A reach into the cash
drawer, take what he could gather, and run. The state's second witness
says that he saw B intentionally grab a can from the middle of a stack
causing all the cans above it to fall. The state's third witness, a police
expert, describes the crime of till tapping. He testifies that the behavior
reported by the two witnesses constitutes a classic modus operandi. A
escaped, and the jury must decide whether B is guilty of larceny.
The jury is both educated by and asked to defer to each of the witnesses. The two lay witnesses tell the jury what occurred as each saw it.
In this sense, the jury has been educated in the facts of the case. Yet the
jury cannot know, apart from the witnesses' assertions, what they saw.
The state is asking the jurors to defer to the witnesses' portraits of what
occurred. It is true that the portrait may be challenged-one witness
may be shown to be nearly blind and the other to be B's lifelong enemybut the fact that the jury can choose not to defer and has been given
reasons not to defer does not change the fact that the prosecutor is nevertheless seeking deference.
This situation does not disturb us because we believe that jurors are
familiar with the implications of the facts that cut for and against deference to the witnesses' stories. Indeed, what I describe as a deference
process, Allen and Miller would, no doubt, call education. The essence
of the process is providing the jurors with facts that allow them to apply
their own reason and experience to the questions they confront-in this
case, whether the state's witnesses are telling the truth. But the credibility-related facts the jurors evaluate come from other witnesses to whom
the jurors are in turn asked to defer.
The chain appears potentially infinite, but it is stopped short by convention. The convention is that each juror's reason and experience al2 Id. at 1146-47.
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lows her to determine on the basis of demeanor, consistency, and other
characteristics of a witness's testimony whether that witness is telling the
truth. Consequently, at some point, almost always a very early point,
one need not present the jury with facts extrinsic to a witness's testimony
to ensure that a juror is not simply deferring to what she has been told
but is actively deciding whether what she has been told is worthy of
deference.
Yet a convention that assumes that a juror's acceptance of a witness's story is based on reason and experience rather than pure deference
poses problems. First, the convention may not be behaviorally accurate.
A juror may simply and uncritically defer to a witness. Second, the convention assumes that reason and experience provide a rational basis for
credibility judgments when, in fact, they may not. Aspects of demeanor,
such as the confidence of an eyewitness, 3 may be a poor guide to credibil4
ity as may other heuristics that humans apply in assessing evidence.
Thus, even with ordinary witnesses the education/deference distinction breaks down. Jurors are always asked to defer to witnesses. What
varies is the amount of information on which jurors base deference decisions and the degree to which deference resolves the jury's verdict-related
tasks. Expert testimony is of special concern because deferring to an expert's conclusions often substitutes the expert's judgment for a large part
of what the law expects the jury to discern, as when a jury assessing an
insanity defense accepts a psychiatrist's conclusion that the defendant
did not know right from wrong. But lay witnesses pose the same danger,
as when a victim's story is the only evidence of a crime.
Now consider the expert in our example, the police officer who testifies to the modus operandi of till tappers. His testimony both educates
and seeks deference. Jurors are educated in the sense that they have
learned a new way of interpreting the described behavior. Yet, the very
goal of educating the jurors on the modus operandi of till tappers is to
encourage deference to the expert's conclusion linking B with A. It is
true, as with the lay witnesses, that the parties may dispute whether deference to the conclusion is deserved. But, as with the lay witnesses, the
fact that deference is not automatic does not mean that it does not occur.
The important distinction between the lay and expert witness in this
example is that the jurors who defer to the lay witnesses still must rely on
their common sense and experience to determine the legal implications of
what they have learned. Indeed, the lay witnesses would not be allowed
to share with the jurors their belief that B had colluded with A. But
deference to the officer's conclusions virtually determines the jurors'
verdict.
3 See ELIZABETH F. LoFrus & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL § 1.02, § 1.04 (1987).
4 RICHARD NISBETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF
SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980).
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One reason expert testimony poses serious problems for both the
legal system and academic theorists is that the law assimilates different
kinds of testimony under the same general rules. Consider a scientist
who compares DNA found in semen taken from a rape victim with the
DNA of a suspect. She testifies that the DNA taken from the two
sources match and that there is a one in 50,000 chance that a match
would occur with a randomly chosen man. Compare this testimony with
the testimony of the till tapping expert and the lay witnesses in the previ-

ous example, taking the perspective of Allen and Miller's ideally situated
juror who can enter the head of each testifying witness and make her
own assessment of the perceptions that animate the witness's testimony.
We can imagine how this juror with privileged access to witness perceptions would react as each witness testified. When a lay witness spoke
the juror might respond, "Yes, that's how I would interpret what happened," or perhaps, "No, B wasn't trying to remove the can; it was an
accident." When the DNA expert testified, the juror would be more
likely to say, "So that's what this all means," for a typical juror with
privileged access to the expert's perception of, for example, the configuration of DNA on an autorad or the distribution of allele lengths in a reference data base would not know what to make of the observations she and
the expert shared.
The privileged juror would find the perceptions the police expert
recalled while testifying more like those recalled by the lay witness than
like those recalled by the DNA expert. The data the officer would remember while testifying-other examples of how till tappers operatewould be more understandable than the data the DNA expert draws on
both because of its greater familiarity and because of its fit with interpretive methodologies the juror is accustomed to using. Thus the juror
might endorse the officer's conclusion, thinking, "The pattern of cooperation is so like other cases of known till tapping that a conspiracy is
clear," or the juror might interpret the officer's data differently, concluding, "There is no other case in which till tappers cooperated in precisely
this way; it is too much of a leap from other forms of distracting clerks to
say that B's behavior fits a classic modus operandi."
The testimony of the lay witnesses and the police expert resemble
each other more than they resemble the DNA expert's testimony5 because they are based on underlying data-perceptions the witness called
5 Different similarities emerge from other perspectives. The DNA expert's testimony is arguably like the lay witnesses' testimony in that each reports facts for the jury to consider; in contrast, the
police officer tells the jury how to work with facts that other witnesses have presented. (Note, however, that to the extent the DNA expert bases her testimony on the hearsay of others, she too is
interpreting for the jury the implications of what others have said.) From a third perspective, the
testimony of the two experts is similar because each is based on judgments that ordinary people
could not make, even though exposed to the same case facts as the experts. It is this similarity that
the law recognizes in Rule 702 which specifies the bases of expertise.
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to mind in determining what occurred-that an ordinary juror could in6
terpret for herself if she could only access the data as the witness can.
From this it would appear that if the law were concerned with educating
jurors so that they could more fully judge events for themselves, it would
require the lay witnesses and the police expert to present the fundamental
perceptions that underlie their testimony while it would allow the DNA
expert to simply state the fact and probability of a match. We often see
just the opposite.
DNA experts typically testify to such things as how DNA is extracted from semen, how it is run on a gel, the appearance of an autorad,
and the way in which a reference data base was constructed. Lay witnesses like those in the example, however, are not required to break down
their global perceptions into constituent sense data. Similarly, the police
officer on direct examination would not be required to rehearse for the
jury the details of other till tapping incidents with which he was familiar.
Does the law have things backward? I think not. Instead, the law
adapts to how people ordinarily think. Lay witnesses ordinarily report
behavior based on global assessments or gestalts. Those who link behavior to a modus operandi make a similar global assessment in matching a
particular instance of behavior to a body of varied and overlapping information of which they are aware. DNA experts, on the other hand, have
an expertise that has been institutionalized, for the acceptability of their
testimony turns less on their own expertise than it does on the fact that
an accepted protocol for determining DNA matches has been followed.
In telling jurors of that protocol and what each step accomplishes, the
expert is justifying her conclusion in much the same way the police officer justifies, his conclusion by describing his years of experience.
The DNA expert's testimony will leave jurors feeling as if they have
been educated in the technology of DNA identification even if the jurors'
new found knowledge provides no basis for second-guessing the expert's
judgment. This inability to make well-grounded second guesses is typical
7
of situations involving technical scientific evidence.
The jurors who heard the police officer will also feel educated about
6 One can argue that a more intelligent commentary would be possible if a juror in a DNA
expert's head could review everything the DNA expert had learned about DNA analysis, and that
from one perspective the officer's store of knowledge about till tapping crimes could be analogized to
the DNA expert's store of knowledge about DNA analysis. However, the officer's knowledge base is
easily understood by laypersons in a way that the DNA expert's is not. Even if this is actually a
difference in degree, practically, it is so large as to amount to a difference in kind. But I think it is in
fact a difference in kind. Consider by way of analogy a complicated mathematics problem which is
given to two students along with detailed information about how to solve it. Even though they have
identical information about how to solve the problem and similar training in mathematics, one may
find the answer while the other remains mystified.
7 In one special case, however, detailed expert testimony will provide such a basis: when the
jury learns that the expert's conclusions assume certain facts, and the jury is in a good position to
determine if the assumed facts exist.
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an unfamiliar modus operandi, even though his testimony is largely conclusory and consequently demands deference. The lack of detailed
knowledge about the information underlying the officer's opinion is not
troubling for, as with the lay witnesses, the possibility that the officer's
conclusions misinterpret more basic data may be raised on cross-examination. The officer might be asked, for example, if he knew of other cases
in which the confederate of a till tapper created a disturbance by pulling
down a display of cans, just as the lay witness could be asked whether B
looked down the aisle toward the cash register before he reached for the
can.
The problems that expert testimony pose for courts are most acute
when opposing experts give conflicting testimony. At the outset the naive observer is shocked, for expertise is thought to allow individuals to
perceive with special reliability what the nonexpert cannot. When witnesses claiming the same expertise disagree, the frailness of each expert's
claim to special testimonial status is evident, as is the jury's resulting
problem: if two experts cannot agree, how can a jury choose between
them? There is no easy answer to this question. In some situations, jurors may be helpless in the face of scientific disagreement. In others, a
comparison of credentials, ordinary credibility cues, testimonial coherence, the jurors' knowledge, or other facts in the case may provide the
jurors with a rational basis on which to resolve a conflict.
Given the impossibility of educating most jurors to the level of most
experts, the practical question is less likely to be whether jurors should be
educated or expected to defer than it is to be how much information
should jurors be given before deference is sought. A party's answer to
this question-and it is the parties who in practice answer it-will turn
not on an abstract desire to educate the jury but on a judgment about the
amount and kind of information that is most likely to lead the jury to
side with the expert. The issue then is information, not education or
deference. Postulating a dichotomy misleads. The choices Allen and
Miller point to are choices between giving jurors more or less information. More information may suggest educated decisionmaking while less
information may suggest deference, but there is no quantum of information that determines education or deference, and giving jurors more information may not diminish or may even enhance the probability of
uncritical deference to a witness's conclusion .
It is not surprising that although Allen and Miller properly force
their readers to confront directly the implications of various policy arguments for information given to the jury and for visions of the jury's capacity to use information, their discussion packs little normative punch.
The education/deference dichotomy has little bite because it does not
8 Thus Bell and Loftus report that the more minor details witnesses include in their testimony,
the more persuasive witnesses tend to be. Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F. Loftus, TrivialPersuasionin
the Courtroom: The Power of (a few) Minor Details, 56 J. PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 669 (1989).
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capture what is at stake in informing the jury. But can we do better? If
the distinction between education and deference is of little help in deciding how much supporting information expert witnesses should provide
before offering conclusions, is there some other perspective that can aid
in confronting this normative question? I believe there is.
II.

STORIES AND EXPERTS

This perspective is the "story model" perspective developed by the
psychologists Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie.9 Pennington and
Hastie argue that the typical trial is a contest between the adequacy of
competing stories to explain the evidence presented, and that the party
that offers the jury facts that can be most easily assimilated into a preferred story will prevail. Although Pennington and Hastie do not consider the implications of their theory for expert testimony, I think it can
illuminate complexities in this area.
Thinking of the trial as a story told through witnesses highlights
different functions that expert testimony can play. First, expert testimony can tell virtually the entire story, or, at least, the only part of the
story that is in dispute. In a rape case, for example, the only contested
portion of the story may be the defendant's involvement, which today
will often be decided by DNA evidence. It is important that the jury
receive considerable information about the DNA test, not to secondguess an expert's judgment, but so that the jury (and the defendant) can
understand why the story of the trial has been and may properly be reduced to a DNA test. Absent such information, the jury may be unwilling to convict, or it may appear that the expert's considered judgment
and not the jury's is convicting the defendant.1 0
A second use of expert testimony is to fill in gaps in stories. Unlike
the first situation in which the expert testimony determines the story,
when expert testimony fills story gaps, the story may carry the expert
testimony along with it. Consider for example a suit brought against the
Beatrice Company for illnesses attributed by plaintiffs to Beatrice's contamination of a town's wells.II The Beatrice Company was likely to have
contaminated ground water through its toxic waste disposal practices;
9 See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence" Tests of the Story Model for
JurorDecision Making, 62 J. P RS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. 189 (1992); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie,
A Cognitive Theory ofJurorDecision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 519 (1991);
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-BasedDecisionMaking: Effects of Memory Structure
on Judgment, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 521 (1988); see
also Richard Lempert, Telling Tales in Court: TrialProcedureand the Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L.
REV. 559 (1991).
10 Also, as I pointed out in note 7, supra, there may be occasions where the jury will be in a good
position to find facts that resolve a conflict between experts. This would be impossible if one DNA
expert simply claimed there was a match between the evidence DNA and the defendant's DNA
while the other expert did no more than deny that claim.
11 The Beatrice case along with a companion case involving W.R. Grace & Co. is discussed
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the town's wells were contaminated by the kinds of chemicals that Beatrice had allegedly dumped, and the plaintiffs had diseases that might
arguably be attributed to toxic contamination of the kind for which Beatrice was responsible. But these facts are not enough for a plaintiff victory; a winning story requires more of a connection. The plaintiffs must
be correct in their assertion that Beatrice's effluents polluted their town's
wells. The plaintiffs' problem was that Beatrice's alleged contamination
of ground water occurred at some distance from the wells and on the
other side of a river. To fill in the causation gap, the plaintiffs offered
hydrogeological experts who testified that contaminants from the Beatrice property could migrate to the town's wells. The defendants offered
equally qualified experts who said that migration was impossible given
the position of the river.
The conflicting testimony was sufficiently technical and the issue so
obviously subject to legitimate dispute that neither a jury nor a judge
could have understood the science well enough to resolve the disagreement. Indeed, the conflicting testimony appeared to reflect unresolved
disputes within the science of hydrology. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs' expert evidence was arguably sufficient to prevail. This is not because
taken alone it is more plausible than the defendant's expert evidence, but
because it becomes more plausible when considered along with substantial evidence that the defendant dumped toxic chemicals, the proven contamination of the town's wells, and the defendant's inability to offer a
convincing alternative account of how the wells might have become contaminated. 12 In this sense, a story based largely on other case facts lends
credence to an expert's claims.
When expert testimony is used to fill gaps in a larger story that one
side must tell to prevail, extensive information about the bases of expert
testimony may have little value, particularly in a case like the Beatrice
suit in which the jury and judge have difficulty in comprehending what
they are told. What is important is that a story that appears plausible
based on other evidence is not rendered unlikely by the scientific untenability of a particular link. If reputable scientists drawing on a plausible theory are willing to testify that the posited link is tenable, this may
be all that the legal system can or should require. If a link is scientifically
untenable, a story that depends on it cannot be maintained.
A third use of expert testimony is to provide the jury with a story
plot. This is the function served by the testimony of the police officer in
without a full case name or citation in Mitchell Pacelle, Contaminated Verdict, AM. LAW., Dec.
1986, at 75, 75-80.
12 The defense's attribution of the pollution to the river was apparently not credited by the jury.
The jury nevertheless found for Beatrice because the judge in instructing the jury ruled that the
company could not be held responsible for dumping wastes unless this occurred after a certain date,
and the plaintiff's strongest evidence that Beatrice dumped toxic wastes pertained to times before
that date.
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the till tapping example. The jury has an array of facts before it, but
without expert testimony the jurors will be unaware of one story line that
makes sense of the evidence. The expert testimony in this case, unlike
that in the DNA example, may be believed without being decisive, for
the jury may believe the expert has identified a credible explanatory story
yet find another story explaining B's clumsiness even more credible. But
the expert's testimony will be necessary for a conviction if without it an
alternative exonerative story, like an accident story, will have no
competition.
Where expert testimony provides a jury with a story plot, the expert's testimony is likely to synthesize either wide reading in some relevant literature or experience that is difficult to share in detail with a jury.
What matters is that the expert is in a position to know a range of alternative stories and that the jurors are able to trust the expert when he
characterizes the case facts as consistent with the plot he provides. The
first requisite is ordinarily better established through an expert's qualifications than through an attempt to share the data that undergird the
expert's opinion. The second requisite calls attention to the possibility
that the fit between the case facts and the plot the expert offers to explain
them will appear closer than an ex ante extrapolation from the expert's
store of knowledge would have suggested. The solution, however, is not
to require the expert on direct examination to share his ex ante knowledge store with the jury. He knows too much for this to be practical.
Instead, it is for the judge to ensure that the expert's testimony is not an
ad hoe formulation designed to incriminate the defendant and for opposing counsel to cross-examine the expert about the degree to which his ex
ante knowledge supports his suggestion that the case facts can be explained by the story plot he offers.
Just as the jury tries to make sense of the evidence in a case by
arriving at a-story that best explains it, the jury tries to comprehend each
witness's testimony by arriving at a story that best explains the testimony.' 3 Where a witness's testimony is plausible and consistent with
other evidence in a case, this story is usually a simple one, such as the
witness was on the scene, she has no reason to lie, and she is telling us
what she saw. Where a witness's testimony is inconsistent with other
evidence, the jury's stories are likely to focus on the general trustworthiness, biases, or disabilities of the witness and the other evidence. But
sometimes jurors will be unaware of stories that might plausibly explain
witness testimony.
A fourth use of expert testimony is thus to provide juries with novel
plots that explain not the evidence in the case but the testimony of particular witnesses. An example is the testimony of the eyewitness expert
13 This is a proposition that I advance. Pennington and Hastie's work focuses on case structures. They do not discuss witness credibility.
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who tells the jury that identifications can sometimes be explained by the
normal deficiencies of human information processing and instructs the
jury about the scientific status of cues it might use in deciding whether a
4
witness's version of events can be trusted.'
If juries evaluate both cases and witnesses by story fitting, then every
expert witness will want to embed her conclusion in a story that plausibly
explains it. This will often require the expert to inform the jury in some
detail about the facts and theory that support her conclusion since a good
story to explain an expert's conclusion is one that is consistent, given the
facts of the case, with generally accepted theory. Jurors hearing testimony that explains the theory and highlights the facts justifying an expert's conclusion will have been educated in the sense that they should
have a fuller understanding of the matter before them. Nevertheless, accepting the expert's opinion will be more an act of deference than an
educated judgment. It could hardly be otherwise. The jurors cannot
achieve an expert's understanding, and however much information the
expert provides, her testimony is designed to motivate the jury to accept
her judgment. There is nothing wrong with this. Indeed, a good reason
to allow jurors to be informed about the facts and theory underlying an
expert's judgment is to give jurors the sense that they are accepting an
expert's judgment for reasons other than brute authority. If an expert's
judgments are not worthy of deference, the expert's testimony should not
be allowed in the first instance.
III.

THE REACH OF RULE

703

Perhaps the best test of the story model perspective is its utility in
resolving disputes over how expert testimony should be treated. Consider by way of example an application of this perspective to the controversy between Ron Carlson' 5 and Paul Rice1 6 that Allen and Miller so
interestingly discuss. The question that divides Carlson and Rice is
14 In doing so, the expert encourages the jury to explain a witness's identification through, for
example, an "extreme stress distorted her perceptions" story rather than a "defendant did it" story.

The eyewitness expert's testimony appears educational since she does not say that certain witnesses
can or cannot be believed but rather informs jurors of those circumstances that make eyewitness
testimony more or less valid. The parties offering eyewitness experts are, however, seldom content to

equip jurors to make their own educated judgments. Instead, the expert witness will emphasize
those aspects of the identification that are prone to error, and the jury will be encouraged to accept

the expert witness's implicit judgment that a mistake occurred in the given instance. Moreover,
while it is common for eyewitness experts to cite studies supporting their cautions, the citations are
less an educational than a rhetorical tactic, for the jury can only defer to the expert's reliance on and
characterization of the research cited. Thus even in testimony that appears overtly educational,
large amounts of deference are sought.
15 Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as Hearsay Conduits: ConfrontationAbuses in Opinion Testimony,
76 MINN. L. REV. 859 (1992) [hereinafter Carlson, Hearsay]; Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the Bases
of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577 (1986) [hereinafter Carlson, Expert Testimony];
Ronald L. Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony: Limitationson Affirmative Introductionof
Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 234 (1984).
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whether Federal Rule of Evidence 703 should be interpreted to allow
otherwise inadmissible evidence to be presented to the jury when it helps
form the basis for an expert's conclusions. The story model suggests that
the answer should turn on how the inadmissible evidence fits into various
stories the jury might construct.
Often otherwise inadmissible evidence that supports an expert's conclusions fits only a story relating to the expert's credibility. In these
circumstances, the evidence should be admissible to bolster the trustworthiness of the expert's conclusions by showing the jury that she has considered the range of relevant evidence and that this evidence is consistent
with her conclusions. On occasion, however, inadmissible evidence not
only supports an expert's testimony, but also supports a potentially influential story that can be constructed without the expert's help. In the
worst case, the story that requires no expertise to construct may be more
likely to influence the jury than the story the expert tells. In such cases,
otherwise inadmissible evidence introduced through an expert is likely to
be misused, possibly leading to the suspicion that the expert's testimony
was offered to foster the misuse. Inadmissible evidence should not be
allowed in such cases.
Consider, for example, an accident reconstruction expert who, in
concluding that the defendant was speeding, relies in part on a bystander's notes describing the defendant's car's skid marks. The notes
are inadmissible hearsay, but if it is scientifically defensible for an accident reconstruction expert to consider such notes, the expert ought to be
able to disclose the notes to the jury and explain how the bystander's
observations figured in her conclusions. The jury is likely to consider
this information only as part of the expert's testimony, for without the
expert's interpretation, the jury could not easily construct a "defendant
was speeding" story from the skid mark information. Moreover, if the
defendant's expert appeared to be scientifically more competent than the
plaintiff's expert, the plaintiff's case would not receive an independent
boost from the skid mark information; it would persuade only to the
extent that it made for a more credible expert story. 17
Suppose however that instead of referring to skid marks, the bystander's notes asserted that while the plaintiff was traveling within the
speed limit, the defendant was going fifty miles per hour in a twenty-five
mile per hour zone. Even if accident reconstruction experts ordinarily
consider such bystander observations in reconstructing accidents, Rule
703 should be interpreted to allow the plaintiff's expert to say no more on
direct examination than that she considered bystander reports of speed in
16 Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basisfor Expert Opinion Testimony: A Response to
Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583 (1987).
17 The jury would be properly suspicious of the defendant's expert's story if it could not account
for the skid marks and the plaintiffs expert's story could. Evidence of the skid marks would not
hurt and might help the defendant if a plausible defense story explained their presence.
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reaching her conclusion. Otherwise the jurors might find for the plaintiff
not because they find the plaintiff's scientific story more credible than the
defendant's opposing version, but because they are willing to construct a
"defendant was speeding story" to explain the bystander's observation.
Even though the jurors' story construction is not irrational, the hearsay
rule forbids such reasoning.
Honoring the hearsay rule in these circumstances deprives the plaintiff of a legitimate benefit, since the need to interpret Rule 703 presupposes the scientific validity of considering the bystander's statement. For
this reason, the expert should be able to indicate that she considered a
bystander's observations about the speed the cars were going. The jurors
will, of course, be able to figure out that the bystander is likely to have
reported that the defendant was speeding, and to this extent, the inadmissible evidence may aid the plaintiff apart from its contributions to the
expert's opinion. But merely alluding to the bystander's notes differs
from recounting their contents in that only the recounting provides the
jurors with enough information to construct a speeding story although
they otherwise discredit the expert testimony. Whether under the guise
of interpreting Rule 703 or applying Rule 403, this compromise strikes
an appropriate balance.18
The story model perspective thus suggests that if truth within the
spirit of the evidence rules is our goal, neither Carlson nor Rice have
carried the day on the issue of how Rule 703 should be interpreted. My
argument based on the story model is that courts applying Rule 703
should appreciate the contingencies of expert testimony and jury reasoning and interpret the rule accordingly. Inadmissible evidence that experts properly rely on in forming opinions should be kept from the jury
only when and to the degree to which the evidence might encourage the
jury to construct a story that could determine the verdict even if the
testimony of the expert offering the evidence is otherwise unpersuasive. 19
18 Professor Carlson would allow the expert to tell the jury that bystanders' reports were considered, but it is not clear that he would allow the jury to know that the reports concerned the speed at
which the cars were traveling. See Carlson, Hearsay, supra note 15; Carlson, Expert Testimony,
supra note 15. Moreover, this is as far as he would go even if the jury could not construct a defendant liability story from the information on which the expert relied. He would not admit hearsay to
show the length of skidmarks.
19 For a case example that illustrates this perspective, see Gong v. Hirsch, 913 F.2d 1269 (7th
Cir. 1990), in which the issue was whether the plaintiff's decedent had suffered a peptic ulcer due to a
drug prescribed by the defendant. The plaintiff's medical expert was unable to introduce a letter
from the deceased's family doctor stating that the plaintiff's decedent had a peptic ulcer traceable to
the prescribed drug because the court found that the doctor's letter did not technically qualify as a
business record and was not the type of evidence reasonably relied on by experts or, if it was, was
still insufficiently trustworthy to pass the Rule 403 balancing test. The court's trustworthiness judgment is questionable for, with a proper foundation, one can easily imagine the letter qualifying as a
business record. Also, since the naming of the drug that caused the disease had nothing to do with
the purpose for which the letter was written, there is no reason apart from its hearsay character to
suspect the trustworthiness of this information. Moreover, experts consider the opinions of other
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IV.

CONCLUSION

I began this Essay by reflecting on Allen and Miller's interesting
comments on expert testimony. I argued that their education/deference
dichotomy was misfocused, but that they were right in calling attention
to the ways in which many disputes regarding expert testimony are disputes about conceptions of the jury and about the amount of information
juries should be given. I then turned to a new way of thinking about
trials-the story model. This perspective, I argued, suggests normative
judgments about the minimum amount of information that experts
should provide juries. In most cases, however, we need not worry about
the minimum being provided since informing juries why an expert judgment has been formed is a rhetorical tactic that fosters deference even
while increasing juror understanding. I also suggested that the story
model provides a perspective from which to rethink evidentiary policy,
and I illustrated this with a discussion of what the model portends for the
dispute between Professors Carlson and Rice about how best to interpret
Rule 703's permission to base expert testimony on otherwise inadmissible
evidence. Ultimately, like Allen and Miller, I conclude that attending to
the informational implications of rules regarding expert testimony is central to their evaluation.

experts all the time. But from the story model perspective, the decision to exclude the information
makes sense, for even if the plaintiff's expert's judgment did not persuade the jury of the existence
and cause of the ulcer, the family doctor's otherwise inadmissible hearsay might. Note that the story
model would suggest a different result than does the court's analysis had the letter merely listed
symptoms suggestive of a drug-induced ulcer. In these circumstances a story model analysis would
admit the letter, for a jury could not determine its implications without an expert's aid; under the
court's analysis the letter would remain excluded. Yet I do not think a court that, like the Gong
court, was willing to read Rule 703 as removing the general bar of hearsay would have excluded the
hypothesized letter. In short, I think the Gong court was motivated by story model considerations
without thinking in those terms.
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